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Abstract: This study investigates whether female directors have a significant effect on financial 
performance of publicly listed companies in the Vietnamese market. Using a dynamic random-effects 
model to explore a panel dataset comprising 480 firm-year observations, we report that the companies 
with female directors in their boardrooms perform better than those without. Our finding thus 
supports the proposition that boardroom gender diversity appears to be an important internal 
corporate governance strategy which helps to improve firm performance. As Vietnam and many other 
East Asian countries are now implementing compulsory policies or calling for voluntary attempts to 
increase board gender diversity, our paper is especially timely and provides useful insight for policy 
formulation. 
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1. Introduction 
Gender diversity in boardrooms is one of the controversial issue of corporate 
governance. Motivated by the view that female directors may have a significantly 
positive impact on firms’ governance and profitability, more and more countries 
are now implementing compulsory policies or calling for voluntary attempts to 
increase gender diversity in the boardrooms. In Vietnam, while gender equality in 
social activities has become a hot issue in political agenda, the relationship 
between board gender diversity and firm performance has not received much 
attention from scholars. A recent study of Nguyen, Locke, and Reddy (2015), using 
system GMM regression method, suggests that boardroom gender diversity does 
have a positive effect on financial performance of the Vietnamese listed 
companies. 
This current study differs from the study of Nguyen et al. (2015) in that we employ 
another econometric estimation technique, namely a dynamic random-effects 
estimation technique to take into account the unobservable heterogeneity inherent 
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in the corporate governance–firm performance relationship. Our study shows that 
the presence of female directors may have a significantly positive influence on firm 
financial performance as measured by Tobin’s Q ratio. This finding is consistent 
with much earlier work including Bonn, Yoshikawa, and Phan (2004); Campbell 
and Mínguez-Vera (2008); Erhardt, Werbel, and Shrader (2003); and Lückerath-
Rovers (2013), amongst others. However, it is very important to advise that the 
regression estimations in this research are implemented under a strict assumption 
of the exogeneity, that is, corporate governance mechanisms are treated as 
exogenous factors of the firm. If that is not the case, then this study’s findings 
should be interpreted with care. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. First, we review the related 
literature to develop our main research hypothesis. Data, data sources, and method 
are described next. We finally present the results of the data analysis and conclude 
the paper with the findings’ discussion and limitations of the study. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
Although gender diversity is widely used as one of the key proxies for board 
diversity, there is no consensus amongst researchers about what board diversity 
covers. Walt and Ingley (2003) state that board diversity is the combination of 
various characteristics of directors, which are associated with decision-making and 
other processes within the board. These characteristics can be categorised as: (i) 
observable characteristics including demographic characteristics such as ethnicity, 
nationality, gender and age; and (ii) unobservable characteristics such as 
knowledge, educational and professional background, industry experience, 
amongst others (Erhardt et al., 2003). Erhardt et al. (2003) comment that most of 
the recent studies on the relationship between board diversity and financial 
performance concentrate on demographic characteristics, including gender and 
ethnicity. Hence, they simply define board diversity as the portrayal of ethnic and 
gender differences within the board. Similarly, Lückerath-Rovers (2013); and Walt 
and Ingley (2003) document that being the most easy distinguished demographic 
characteristic, gender is widely utilised as the primary characteristics of the board 
diversity in the extant literature. 
Theoretically, agency theorists advocate that the diversity of the board is one of the 
measures of its independence (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), and that independent 
boards are more effective at their function of managerial monitoring, which may 
lead to a positive impact on firm performance (Muth & Donaldson, 1998). 
Similarly, Erhardt et al. (2003) argue that board diversity and the subsequent 
conflicts, caused by diverse group dynamics, may have positive influences on 
managerial monitoring function and could be employed to diminish potential 
agency problems. According to resource dependence theory, board diversity helps 
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companies to obtain and maintain their important external resources. For example, 
with regard to legitimacy, most governments in the world call for gender equality, 
which put pressure on companies to add women to their boards. Hillman, Cannella, 
and Harris (2002) suggest that the legitimacy of firms may be improved by adding 
more female directors in the boardrooms. It is also argued that firm’s credibility 
and performance can be improved by the prestige of its board members (Hillman & 
Dalziel, 2003). By extension, this implies that the reputation of firms can be 
affected by their leaders’ individual characteristics (human capital) which can be 
obtained by the diversification of the board.  
Empirically, it is questionable whether board diversity, especially in terms of 
gender diversity, may provide the board with better efficiency that can motivate the 
firm performance (Rose, 2007). In this regard, it is argued that although gender 
diversity may be widely considered as an indicator of positive discrimination, its 
influence on the firm performance is not clear (Erhardt et al., 2003). In fact, the 
empirical studies on this relationship provide us with inconsistent results 
(Lückerath-Rovers, 2013; Rose, 2007). For example, using a sample data of 112 
large companies in the U.S market at two different years (1993 and 1998), Erhardt 
et al. (2003) indicate that board diversity (as measured by the percentage of women 
and minorities on the board) is positively related to firm performance (as measured 
by return on total assets [ROA] and return on investment [ROI] ratios). For smaller 
economies, Lückerath-Rovers (2013), through investigating the nexus of gender 
diversity on the board and firm performance in 99 Dutch listed companies, 
concludes that companies with female directors have better profitability than those 
without female directors on their boards. Similarly, Reddy, Locke, Scrimgeour, and 
Gunasekarage (2008) find that there is a significant positive relationship between 
women directors and financial performance of small cap companies in New 
Zealand, giving support for the gender diversification of the board. Meanwhile, a 
study of Rose (2007), examining a sample data of all Danish companies listed on 
Copenhagen Stock Exchange during 1998–2001 in a cross-sectional analysis, 
shows that there is no significant relationship between firm performance and 
female board representation. 
While the relationship between gender diversity and firm performance is becoming 
increasingly one of the important topics of modern corporate governance, there is 
likely a lack of empirical evidence regarding this relationship within the Asian 
context. A rare study of Bonn et al. (2004), comparing the effect of board diversity 
(as measured by the ratio of female directors on the board) on firm performance 
between Japan and Australia, provides mixed evidence. They find that this nexus 
for Australian companies is positive when performance is measured by the market 
to book ratio, but is insignificant with ROA ratio. Meanwhile, this relationship is 
insignificant for both measures for Japanese firms. Bonn et al. (2004) discuss that 
the quantity of female directors of Japanese companies is too small (about 0.86% 
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on average) to have any influence on firm performance. It is argued that the modest 
representation of female directors on the board is comprehensible in male-
dominant Asian societies where females usually take on their traditional role. In 
contrast, using a dynamic panel generalised method of moment approach, a more 
recent study of Wellalage and Locke (2013) shows that female board 
representation has a significant negative impact on firm value of Sri Lankan listed 
companies. This finding is consistent with that obtained by Adams and Ferreira 
(2009) using data from the U.S market. 
Given that the predictions of agency theory and resources dependence theory about 
the potential influences of board diversity on the quality of board decisions, which 
in turn will be able to be reflected in firm performance (Lückerath-Rovers, 2013; 
Van der Walt, Ingley, Shergill, & Townsend, 2006), it is not unreasonable to 
hypothesise that gender diversity will have a significant impact on firm financial 
performance. Hence, we propose the main hypothesis of this research as follows:  
Hypothesis: There is a significant relationship between board gender diversity and 
financial performance of publicly listed companies in Vietnam. 
 
3. Data and Method 
3.1. Data and Data Sources 
We collect data of 120 non-financial companies listing on the Ho-Chi-Minh Stock 
Exchange (HOSE) and the Hanoi Stock Exchange (HNX) during a four-year period 
from 2008 to 2011. Hence, a panel dataset comprising 480 firm-year observations 
is used. The detailed definitions of variables used in this study are as follows. The 
financial performance measure, namely Tobin’s Q is used as dependent variables 
(denoted by qratio). Tobin’s Q is the sum of market value of equity and book value 
of debt all divided by the book value of total assets.  
Explanatory variables include: (i) boardroom gender diversity (the percentage of 
female directors, denoted by womdir); (ii) board size (the natural logarithm of total 
number of board directors, denoted by lnbsize); (iii) block-holder ownership (the 
percentage of common stocks held by shareholders who own at least five percent 
of the total number of a firm’s common stocks, denoted by block); (iv) leverage 
(total debt over total assets, denoted by lev); (v) firm age (the natural logarithm of 
number of years from the time a company first appears on the stock markets, 
denoted by lnfage); (vi) firm size (the natural logarithm transformation of the book 
value of total assets, denoted by fsize). In addition, industry dummies and year 
dummies are included in all of the models, where appropriate. 
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3.2. Method 
In this study, we use one year lagged dependent variable (denoted by lagqratio) as 
an explanatory variable in the regression models to capture unobserved factors that 
can interact with the relationship between corporate governance variables and 
performance variable. It is argued that including the lagged dependent variable as a 
proxy for omitted variables is a simple and useful approach to account for 
historical factors that have potential impacts on current differences in the 
regressant (Wooldridge, 2009).  
Moreover, by using panel data, this study can take into account the unobservable 
heterogeneity ignored by several prior researches (e.g., Bonn et al., 2004; 
Lückerath-Rovers, 2013; and Rose, 2007 amongst others). Unobservable 
heterogeneity exists when the relationship between corporate governance and 
performance is influenced by unobserved factors. For example, company specific 
features such as managerial skills, company culture, or employee capability, which 
are unobserved and constant over time, may affect firm performance. Fixed-effects 
model and random-effects model are two common methods to estimate unobserved 
effects using panel data. To compare with prior studies and examine the potential 
problems from ignoring the unobservable heterogeneity, we estimate three models 
using panel data: (i) a pooled OLS model; (ii) a fixed-effects model; and (iii) a 
random-effects model.  
Nevertheless, according to Brown, Beekes, and Verhoeven (2011), one of the main 
pitfalls of the fixed-effects (within estimators) model is that it only uses time 
variation in variables within each cross-sectional observation (each firm) to drive 
the regression results. This is obvious inadequate since most of the corporate 
governance variables are time-invariance variables or slowly-changing variables 
(in our case: womdir variable). In this situation, the fixed-effects (within 
estimators) model is inappropriate because it cannot provide good estimators. 
Whereas, random-effects model is widely utilised to analyse panel data with large 
cross-sectional objects (companies) relative to time (years) (Bartels, 2008).  
It is common for researchers to employ Hausman test to choose between fixed-
effects and random-effects models. Hausman test examines the differences between 
the random-effects and fixed- effects estimates. This test is implemented under an 
important assumption of random-effects model that unobserved factors are 
uncorrelated with explanatory variables. However, Bartels (2008) criticises that 
this is an impractical hypothesis which makes the fixed-effects model become a 
better choice. This implies that Hausman test is not the unique criterion to select 
between the two models. Wooldridge (2002) judges that:  
In cases where the key variables do not vary much over time, fixed-effects method 
can lead to imprecise estimates. We may be forced to use random-effects 
estimation in order to learn anything about the population parameters. […] Without 
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using an instrumental variables approach, random-effects estimation is probably 
our only choice (pp. 326, 328).  
Thus, if the assumption underlying random-effects model holds, this model will be 
appropriate with our data features (N is large, T is small, and key variable does not 
vary much over time). To put more effort into controlling for the part of 
unobserved factors correlated with independent variables, we include dummy 
variables for different industries in the estimated model. 
 
4. Results and Discussion 
Preliminary regression results conducted by using ordinary least squares approach 
for pooled data are shown in Column 2 and Column 3 of Table 11. The results 
indicate that womdir variable (the percentage of female directors) is positively and 
significantly related to Tobin’s Q at the 5% level (0.0027, t = 2.01), suggesting that 
the research hypothesis should be accepted. This finding is similar to those 
obtained by a number of studies including Reddy et al. (2008) in New Zealand 
market, Campbell and Mínguez-Vera (2008) in Spain market, Lückerath-Rovers 
(2013) in the Netherlands, and Erhardt et al. (2003) in the U.S market. From 
Column 2 and Column 3 of Table 11, it is obvious that past performance can 
statistically significantly explain the variation in current performance (0.6592, t = 
9.18). This is consistent with Wintoki, Linck, and Netter (2012) who confirm the 
importance of using lagged performance variable to evaluate the influence of 
corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance. 
Given that there might be some unobservable heterogeneity that cannot be 
completely captured by past performance (Wintoki et al., 2012), we conduct fixed-
effects (within estimators and between estimators) and random-effects 
specifications to address the concern that unobservable heterogeneity is driving the 
results. We also continue to use lagged dependent variable in the right hand-side of 
these models to account for dynamic. The fixed-effects regression results (within 
estimators) including coefficients and t-statistics are presented in Column 4 and 
Column 5 of Table 11, respectively. The result shows that the coefficients of the 
key variable (womdir) and the past performance variable (lagqratio) now appear 
insignificantly. This may be the consequence of the shortcomings of the fixed-
effects model mentioned in the subsection Method.  
The fixed-effects (between estimators) model is also adopted to compare with the 
fixed-effects (within estimators) model’s results. It can be seen from Column 6 and 
Column 7 of Table 11 that the coefficients of womdir and lagqratio are significant 
at 5% and 1% levels, respectively. However, this model regresses time average of 
dependent variable on time averages of explanatory variables, therefore, it “ignores 
important information on how the variables change over time” (Wooldridge, 2009, 
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p. 482). Hence, in this study, both fixed-effects models (within estimators and 
between estimators) are undesirable. 
The regression results of the random-effects model are shown in two last columns 
of Table 11. We can observe that the percentage of female directors on the 
boardroom) is positively and significantly related to Tobin’s Q at the 5% level 
(0.0027, t = 2.35). The research hypothesis, therefore, should be accepted. This 
result coincides with several prior studies that confirm the positive relationship 
between gender diversity and firm performance (e.g. Campbell & Mínguez-Vera, 
2008; Erhardt et al., 2003; Lückerath-Rovers, 2013; and Reddy et al., 2008).  
Regarding to other corporate governance variables, there is statistical evidence of a 
significantly positive linkage between block-holder ownership and firm 
performance. This finding is similar to the results obtained by Xu and Wang (1997) 
for the Chinese market. It is argued that concentrated ownership offers greater 
incentives for alignment of the interests of management and shareholders that 
result in better firm financial performance (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006). However, 
Mak and Li (2001) notice that ownership characteristics such as block-holder 
ownership or managerial ownership should be assumed to be endogenously 
determined. They suggest that using two-stage least squares regression may lead to 
better estimates. 
Table 1. Pooled OLS, Fixed-effects and Random-effects regression results 
 
Note: Asterisks indicate significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***). The heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors [se] of pooled OLS estimates; the White robust standard errors, adjusted for 
within cluster correlations, of fixed-effects model; and the heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors of 
random-effects model are included in parentheses in Columns 2; 6; and 8. t statistic and z statistics are 
presented in Columns 3; 5; 7; and 9, respectively. Year dummies and industry dummies are 
Regressors b/(se) t b/(se) t b/(se) t b/(se) z
womdir 0.0027** 2.010 0.0030 1.059 0.0020** 2.290 0.0027** 2.352
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
block 0.0012 1.533 0.0042* 1.914 -0.0002 -0.357 0.0012** 2.396
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
lnbsize 0.0756 0.924 0.0491 0.311 0.0365 0.568 0.0756 0.971
(0.082) (0.158) (0.064) (0.078)
lnfage 0.0317 0.918 0.1954 1.398 0.0168 0.617 0.0317 0.965
(0.035) (0.140) (0.027) (0.033)
fsize 0.0226 1.096 -0.2502** -2.190 0.0126 1.156 0.0226 1.225
(0.021) (0.114) (0.011) (0.018)
lev -0.0003 -0.288 0.0052* 1.900 0.0004 0.679 -0.0003 -0.336
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
lagqratio 0.6592*** 9.175 0.0706 0.423 0.8450*** 31.731 0.6592*** 10.767
(0.072) (0.167) (0.027) (0.061)
constant -0.4737 -0.838 7.2163** 2.390 -0.8657** -2.466 -0.4737 -0.939
(0.565) (3.019) (0.351) (0.505)
year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
industry dummies Yes No Yes Yes
N 359 359 359 359
R
2
0.6829 0.4839 0.9328
Regressant: Tobin's Q
Pooled OLS
Fixed effects               
(within estimators)
Fixed effects              
(between estimators)
Random effects
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unreported. Year dummy 2009 and Industry dummy Oil & Gas are treated as the benchmark 
categories to avoid dummy variable trap. 
 
5. Conclusion and Limitations 
This research discovers the relationship between gender diversity in boardrooms 
and financial performance of the Vietnamese publicly listed companies. After 
controlling for firm size, firm age, time (year), industry, leverage, unobserved 
historical factors, and other corporate governance characteristics, this research 
finds that boardroom gender diversity has a significantly positive effect on 
financial performance of the Vietnamese listed companies.  
Tentative findings notwithstanding, this study does have limitations. First, this 
study contributes to the international debate on the gender diversity-performance 
relationship by adopting a panel data methodology that can better control for 
unobservable heterogeneity. However, this paper does not take into account other 
sources of endogeneity in this relationship which are pointed out by Schultz, Tan, 
and Walsh (2010); and Wintoki et al. (2012). It is still questionable whether greater 
gender diversity on the boardroom may generate higher firm performance, or on 
the contrary, better-performing companies will appoint more female directors on 
their boardrooms. Further studies will gain more robust and reliable interpretations 
if they can account for such sources of endogeneity. 
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